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Guest Post by Stephen Carlisle on Nova Southeastern UniversityMy previous blog post detailed all the reasons why the U.S. Department of Justice could not do what it had announced it was going to do: rule without any hearing, court order or rule-making procedure that ASCAP and BMI were required to engage in 100% licensing. 1 Now, we have seen the written ruling, and you can read along if you wish.2 With all apologies to author Judith Viorst for stealing the title of her book 3 (which I read to my sons many times), what happened last week was a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad decision by the DOJ, which, in truth, is an unmitigated assault on the rights of composers by their own government.What this decision represents is a thoroughly dishonest explanation of what is in fact a gross violation of due process. So, let’s take these one at a time.PART IThe DOJ claims:“First, the plain text of the decrees cannot be squared with an interpretation that allows fractional licensing: the consent decrees require ASCAP to offer users the ability to perform all ‘works’ in its repertory and BMI’s licenses to offer users the ability to perform all ‘compositions’ in its repertory.” 4No, the consent decrees fully endorse fractional licensing. Here is what the 2001 revision to ASCAP’s consent decree says:“ASCAP shall not restrict the right of any member to withdraw from membership in ASCAP…provided that any writer or publisher member who resigns from ASCAP and whose works continue to be licensed by ASCAP by reason of continued membership of a co-writer, writer or publisher of any such works, may elect to continue receiving distribution for such works on the same basis and with the same elections as a member would have, so long as the resigning member does not license the works to any other performing rights organization for performance in the United States.” 5So, ASCAP cannot, by the very plain text of the consent decree, continue to license and collect the share of a former member who has licensed his share to another PRO. Yet, this is exactly what the DOJ says that ASCAP must now do:“[F]or a song co-written by one ASCAP member and one BMI member, the co-writers might designate the ASCAP member to collect all revenues from the licensing of public performance rights to the song and require that the ASCAP member distribute a share of the revenues to the BMI member.” 6Did you read your own consent decree, DOJ? You just suggested what the plain text of the consent decree states unequivocally is prohibited conduct!The DOJ tries to wiggle out of these consequences by stating:“Under these circumstances, the song would not be included in BMI’s repertory.” 7No, you can’t go there either. Because your rationale for reading into the consent decrees the 100% licensing rule is that a PRO writer agrees to license everything in which they have an ownership interest to their PRO. Here is the direct quote from your ruling, DOJ:“Similarly, a songwriter affiliating with BMI grants to BMI the right to license non-dramatic public performances of ‘all musical compositions . . . composed by [the member] alone or with one or more co-writers’ and promises that ‘no performing rights in [these compositions] have been granted to or reserved by others except as specifically set forth therein in connection with Works heretofore written or co-written by [the author].’ BMI Writer Agreement, available at http://www.bmi.com/forms/affiliation/bmi_writer_kit.pdf.” 8Followed by this threat:“In the process of clarifying the works that ASCAP and BMI are able to continue to license under a full-work licensing requirement, the PROs may remind their members that the members made grants of rights to their PRO to license all works of which a member is a partial or complete owner and warranted that there were no other agreements that would prevent licensing on the basis described in the grant of rights.” 9In other words, DOJ, you’ve just recommended that composers breach their licensing agreements with their own PRO’s.So, let’s recap the loopy logic of the DOJ’s argument:- An ASCAP and BMI writer write a song together.
- ASCAP must now license both the ASCAP and BMI share and can collect for both writers, because “[u]nder the copyright law, joint authors of a single work are treated as tenants-in-common, so ‘[e]ach co-owner may thus grant a nonexclusive license to use the entire work without the consent of other co-owners, provided that the licensor accounts for and pays over to his or her co-owners their pro-rata shares of the proceeds.’” 10
- This is the case even though the ASCAP consent decree says that ASCAP cannot do this.
- The remedy for this is for the BMI writer to breach his agreement that licenses “all” of his works to BMI, and instead agree to let ASCAP collect everything.
This is, in fact, the time honored practice of taking a quote out of context. What the SCOTUS is explaining here is why the blanket license is not an anti-trust violation, not that fractional licensing is not allowed in the blanket license system. Because, without the blanket license, the broadcaster would have to perform thousands of individual negotiations, a net benefit to the broadcaster.Here are the sentences that immediately precede the language quoted by the DOJ:“This substantial lowering of costs, which is of course potentially beneficial to both sellers and buyers, differentiates the blanket license from individual use licenses. The blanket license is composed of the individual compositions plus the aggregating service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a different product.” 12And the sentences which immediately follow the DOJ quote:“Many consumers clearly prefer the characteristics and cost advantages of this marketable package, and even small-performing rights societies that have occasionally arisen to compete with ASCAP and BMI have offered blanket licenses. Thus, to the extent the blanket license is a different product, ASCAP is not really a joint sales agency offering the individual goods of many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its blanket license, of which the individual compositions are raw material ASCAP, in short, made a market in which individual composers are inherently unable to compete fully effectively.” 13Quite a different thing, isn’t it? Nothing in this opinion says anything about fractional shares.Next, the DOJ asserts:“Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that ASCAP is ‘required to license its entire repertory to all eligible users,’ and that the repertory includes ‘all works contained in the ASCAP repertory…’ Accordingly, the consent decrees must be read as requiring full-work licensing.” 14Baloney. Again the quote is taken out of context. The Second Circuit isn’t ruling on anything in the quote, it’s just providing factual background. In fact, all the Court is doing here is directly quoting from the consent decree! Here’s the complete quote, which, by the way, is contained in a section of the opinion labeled “Background:”“The core operative provision of AFJ2 provides, in pertinent part, that ASCAP must ‘grant to any music user making a written request therefor a non-exclusive license to perform all of the works in the ASCAP repertory.’ AFJ2 § VI. The decree defines ‘ASCAP repertory’ as ‘those works the right of public performance of which ASCAP has or hereafter shall have the right to license at the relevant point in time.’ Id. § II(C). ‘Right of public performance’ is defined, in pertinent part, as ‘the right to perform a work publicly in a nondramatic manner.’ Id. § II(Q).” 15The Court’s ruling here was whether ASCAP could withdraw “subsets” of their license, particularly digital broadcast rights. The Court concluded it could not. It did not rule that the consent decrees require 100% licensing. No Court has ever said that or anything close to that.The DOJ is just making this up.PART IIIThen there’s this doozy of an explanation:“This statement seeks to explain the bases for the Division’s determination and describe why an express recognition that ASCAP and BMI do currently and must continue to offer full-work licenses should not meaningfully disrupt the status quo in the licensing of public performance rights. As discussed below, the Division encourages the industry to use the next year, during which the Division will forgo enforcement of the full-work licensing requirement, to transition to a common understanding regarding the scope of the ASCAP and BMI licenses. This period should allow stakeholders to resolve any practical challenges relating to complying with the fullwork licensing requirement, including the identification of songs that can no longer be included in ASCAP’s or BMI’s repertories because they cannot be offered on a full-work basis or the voluntary renegotiation of contractual agreements between co-owners to allow ASCAP or BMI to provide a full-work license to the song.” 16Let me get this straight:
- The Consent Decrees currently, and have always, required full work licenses.
- The fact that everyone thought differently doesn’t matter, and this does not evidence a change in policy.
- The fact that the PRO’s based their entire business model on an entirely contrary reading of the consent decrees will “not disrupt the status quo in the licensing of public performance rights.”
- Since this will not disrupt the status quo, we will NOT enforce what is NOT a new rule for a year, so you can figure out the “practical challenges” of what is NOT a new rule.
- And, BTW, since this is NOT a new rule, some songs will no longer be available through ASCAP and BMI as they were in the past.
- You Can’t Make This Stuff Up! The Department of Justice v. ASCAP
- Statement of the Department of Justice on the Closing of the Antitrust Division’s Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees
- Alexander and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Day
- DOJ decision at 12
- United States of America v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishersat page 19.
- DOJ decision at page 20
- Id.
- DOJ Decision at 6-7
- DOJ Decision at 21
- DOJ Decision at 8
- DOJ Decision at 12-13
- Broadcast Music, Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting System 441 U.S. 1 (1979) at 21-22
- Id. at 22
- Pandora Media Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73, Second District Court of Appeal 2015 at 77-78
- Pandora Media Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73, Second District Court of Appeal 2015 at 77
- DOJ Decision at 4
- DOJ Decision at 18-19
- Liege: noun (1). a feudal lord entitled to allegiance and service.
- Re: United States of America v. Broadcast Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787
- DOJ Decision at 21-22
- Pandora Media Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73, Second District Court of Appeal 2015
- You Can’t Make This Stuff Up! The Department of Justice v. ASCAP
- @wearesonala: Songwriters Organization of North America Letter to Renata Hesse at Dept. of Justice [sic] on 100% Licensing
- DOJ Decision at 21
- Re: United States of America v. Broadcast Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787
- Ask Billboard: Max Martin Has Written How Many Hot 100 Top 10s?!
- Billy Joel Song Lyrics
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